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Universalism and Choice of Law
Jay Lawrence Westbrook*
This article discusses choice-of-law analysis in a multinational
bankruptcy case' and sets forth a basic structure for such an analysis. It
discusses the issues in the context of United States bankruptcy law and
uses the decision in an important recent case in the United States to
illustrate.
It is not unusual in multinational bankruptcy cases to see bankruptcy
proceedings opened in more than one country as to the same debtor
because of the need to seize the debtor's assets in each jurisdiction.
Parmalat, Enron, and Dow Coming are among the best-known of many
recent examples. The traditional doctrine applied in such instances was
"territorialism" or "the grab rule," which contemplated that each country
would seize such assets as it could and distribute them according to the
local bankruptcy law. However, the modem approach is
"universalism. '2  In its ideal form, universalism envisions a single
bankruptcy proceeding in the debtor's "home country."3 A single court
would make a unified worldwide distribution to creditors through
* Benno C. Schmidt Chair of Business Law, The University of Texas School of
Law. Some of the concepts in this article were presented as part of a lecture at the Fourth
Annual Conference of the International Insolvency Institute, New York, June, 2004. I am
grateful to Eric Van Horn, Texas '05, for expert research assistance.
1. I use the term "bankruptcy" following United States usage, meaning an
insolvency-type proceeding involving a business debtor that is a legal entity. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, PRINCIPLES OF
COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 2 (American Law Institute 2003) [hereinafter
A.L.I Principles]. Although individual bankruptcies present fascinating questions in the
multinational context, they are not addressed in this article.
2. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of
Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179, 2181 (2000); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A
Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276 (2000) [hereinafter
Global Solution]; but see Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A
Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999); Frederick Tung, Fear Of
Commitment In International Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 555 (2001).
3. See generally, Hannah Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The
Neglected Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 23, 60 (2000)
(arguing for a single jurisdiction internationally following the logic of domestic practice).
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liquidation or reorganization.
Because a pure form of universalism is not immediately achievable,
many universalists have adopted "modified universalism," in which the
courts seek a result in multinational cases as close as possible to a unified
worldwide administration and distribution.4 Although achieving a
unified result is a goal limited by practical questions (like confidence in
the home-country court) and the constraints of local bankruptcy law, a
substantial portion of the benefits of universalism can be obtained by a
best approximation. Among those benefits are a greater level of
predictability in the extension of credit and a far greater likelihood of
successful rescue of a business. The United States is one of the countries
increasingly committed to universalism. 5 One of the consequences of an
embrace of universalism is the need for a substantially more
sophisticated understanding of choice-of-law issues. That is the subject
of this article.6
In any contentious7 multinational bankruptcy case the court must
perform a choice-of-law analysis to determine the validity and
distribution priority of each party's claims. The required choice-of-law
analysis is bifurcated. The court must distinguish between two issues:
1) what is the value of the claim, if any; and 2) what is the priority of the
claim in the distribution of the proceeds of the insolvency proceeding.
The distinction is crucial because the first issue is typically governed by
nonbankruptcy law, while the second is governed by bankruptcy law.8 In
a multinational bankruptcy, it will often be the case that one country's
law will govern the existence and amount of the claim, while another
legal regime will govern its priority of distribution in bankruptcy (among
other issues). In a territorialist jurisdiction, the court will always choose
its own bankruptcy law as to the second issue, whatever choice it makes
as to the first one. In a country with a modem bankruptcy system that
has adopted some form of universalism, the court may be required to
4. See A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 8.
5. See American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency Project, INTERNATIONAL
STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW 73-74 (2003) [hereinafter U.S.
Statement].
6. For a survey of choice-of-law cases in the insolvency area, see Richard Coulson,
32 DENVER J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 275 (2004) (review of cases noting lack of application of
federal common law choice-of-law principles in this area).
7. In many multinational cases, the parties and their representatives see the need for
cooperation and come to agreements that permit them to avoid resolution of difficult
choice-of-law issues. These agreements are often embodied in "protocols." See A.L.I.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 66-67 and Appendix C (samples of protocols). Where
agreement is not possible, however, these legal issues must be resolved by the courts.
8. In a unitary state, the court need only distinguish which statute governs each
issue. In a federated state, one issue may be governed by regional law and the other by a
national bankruptcy law.
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choose the bankruptcy law of another jurisdiction to govern distribution.
I. The Illustrative Case
The case is Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N. V v. Stonington
Partners, Inc.9 Lernout was a company incorporated and managed in
Belgium, but within the year before bankruptcy Lernout had acquired
and merged with two United States companies.t0 The result was that
more than half of Lernout's asset value was located in the United States
on Bankruptcy Day. The acquisitions had been made through grants of
Lernout stock, allegedly accompanied by fraudulent misrepresentations
about the finances of the company. When accounting questions began to
emerge, its stock collapsed and it filed two bankruptcies the same day-a
Chapter 11 in the United States and a Concordat in Belgium.1' The
Belgian proceeding was later converted to a liquidation.
The key point in the case was a true conflict between United States
and Belgian bankruptcy law with regard to the priority in payment to be
given to claims for stock fraud brought by the former owners of certain
of the United States companies acquired by Lernout (the Stonington
claimants). The Stonington claimants alleged that they had been
defrauded by the debtor when they accepted the debtor's stock in
exchange for the companies they had owned. They claimed substantial
damages. United States bankruptcy law subordinates such claims to all
other unsecured claims, with the effect that such claims would receive
9. Lemout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V. v. Stonington Partners, Inc., 268 B.R.
395 (D. Del. 2001) [hereinafter "Lemout I"], rev'd, 310 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter "Lemout II-Circuit"], on remand In re Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products
N.V, 301 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) [hereinafter "Lernout III-Remand"]. To clarify,
the first decision by the bankruptcy court in this litigation was unreported. Thus, this
article describes as "Lernout I" the first reported opinion, the district court decision that
affirmed the unreported decision of the bankruptcy court. "Lernout I1-Circuit" is the
reversal of that district court decision by the Court of Appeals. The further decision by
the bankruptcy court on remand after the appeal is called "Lernout III-Remand." Finally,
the district court decision affirming Lemout III will be called "Lemout IV-Affirmance."
In re Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V., 308 B.R. 672 (D. Del. 2004).
10. This statement of the facts of the case is very similar to that in a second paper
about the Lernout case, Jay L. Westbrook, The Duty to Seek Cooperation in
Multinational Insolvency Cases, in FINANCING AND REFINANCING COMPANIES IN THE
PERSPECTIVE OF INSOLVENCY: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEBATE (University of Geneva,
2004) (forthcoming), available at http://www.unige.ch/droit/insolvency-
symposium2004/wp.htm (last visited February 23, 2005), reprinted in Annual Review of
Insolvency Law, 2004 (2005) (Canada).
11. There is some confusion about the timing, but the Belgian case was filed no later
than the next day. The first Concordat filing was rejected and it was refiled weeks later.
The second filing was accepted, but after the court rejected the debtor's plan for payment,
it was converted into a liquidation. See Lemout III-Remand. The reason for the rejection
of the payment plan by the Belgian court was that the plan followed the United States
rule and provided nothing for the stock-fraud claimants.
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nothing in the Lernout proceeding. 12 Belgian law, by contrast, treats
such claims just like all other unsecured, non-priority claims, entitled to
receive pro rata distribution after priority claims had been paid. Thus
the stock-fraud claimants, who were mostly United States persons, would
receive nothing under United States law, but would get some distribution
under Belgian law. Conversely, the other unsecured creditors would
receive greatly reduced distributions if the Belgian rule were applied. It
appears that most of the assets were under the de facto control of the
American court.
In an unreported opinion, the bankruptcy court held that the United
States subordination rule should apply to the Stonington claims
worldwide and granted an injunction against re-litigation of that point in
the Belgian court. The holding was affirmed by the district court on
appeal. 13 The decision was squarely based on the bankruptcy court's
choice-of-law ruling: that United States bankruptcy law controlled both
bankruptcy proceedings on the issue of priority (subordination) for the
stock-fraud claims. 14  On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for a fresh review. Although
the appellate court made several important rulings, this article will
confine itself to one issue: the choice of law governing the rights of the
stock-fraud claimants in bankruptcy. 15 The appellate court found that the
bankruptcy court's choice-of-law analysis was fundamentally flawed and
must be reconsidered. 16
On remand, the debtor presented a liquidating Chapter 11 plan,'7
which it later revised, allocating the assets of the company between the
United States and Belgian proceedings. 8 The original allocation not
only had given most of the assets to the United States proceeding, but
had left too little for the Belgian court to pay even priority claims. After
negotiation with the Belgian curators, the plan was amended to provide
more funds for the payment of the Belgian priority claims. It appears
that the quid pro quo for the re-allocation may have been the silent
acquiescence of the curators in the revised plan, which still gave most of
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2000). The effect of subordination is that all prior
claims must be paid in full before anything is paid to the holders of subordinated claims,
meaning in most cases such claimants will receive no payment at all.
13. Lernout I, supra note 9.
14. Id. at 400.
15. The author has written a second article on Lernout, focusing on cooperation
between courts. Westbrook, supra note 10.
16. Lernout II-Circuit, supra note 9, at 131.
17. The United States Bankruptcy Code permits the use of a Chapter 11
"reorganization" plan for the purposes of liquidation as well as for reorganization. 11
U.S.C. § I 123(b)(4) (2000).
18. The allocation was justified by a rather conclusory affidavit filed by Lily Chu, an
expert retained by the debtor. Lernout III-Remand, supra note 9, at 654-55.
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the assets to the United States proceeding. The bankruptcy court
approved the plan.19 In approving the plan, the bankruptcy court relied
upon its prior ruling with regard to choice of law: United States
distribution rules applied to distributions in the United States proceeding.
(In light of the appellate decision, it eschewed its earlier claim that the
United States rules applied worldwide.) On that basis, the court found
that the Stonington claimants were entitled to no recovery from the
United States bankruptcy proceeding. The District Court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's approval of the liquidating plan.20 The stock-fraud
claimants, apparently exhausted by the struggle, did not appeal further.
The great bulk of the value of the debtor company was to be
distributed under the United States plan.21 In approving the plan, the
bankruptcy court emphasized that any claimant was free to claim in
Belgium as well, but the allocation of assets meant any non-priority
claim in that proceeding would be worthless. The result was approval of
a largely territorialist result. The problem with that approach, as
explained above, is that the United States is substantially committed to
modified universalism. Modified universalism instructs courts to
interpret and apply each country's bankruptcy law so as to achieve a
result as close to that of a universalist proceeding as is legally possible
and practical in a given case.22 The plan approved in Lernout, by
contrast, is of the sort that would produce dramatically different results
depending on where the assets happen to be found at the time of
bankruptcy-one of the basic defects of territorialism. If, for example, the
accounting questions in that case had remained unrevealed for another
two or three years, the assets might well have shifted substantially away
from the United States. In the dynamic, globalizing world in which we
live, plants might have been thrown up quickly in South Korea or China,
or manufacturing and technical support might have been outsourced to
any of a number of other countries.23 A lender, investor, or customer
19. See Lernout III-Remand, supra note 9, at 654.
20. See Lemout IV-Affirmance, supra note 9.
21. The plan's allocation did not prefer United States persons as such, but rather
preferred all those who filed claims in the United States proceeding and were eligible to
receive distributions under the United States bankruptcy distribution rules, regardless of
their nationality or residence. In fact, the Stonington claimants included a number of
United States persons. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance
Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 499, 513-14 (1991) (territorialism
benefits not only local creditors, but sophisticated multinationals, because in most
countries the effect is to favor the local rules, but not necessarily the local creditors as
such, because most countries do not formally discriminate against foreign creditors). For
a summary of the plan, see Lernout III-Remand, supra note 9, at 654-55.
22. See Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2277.
23. Lernout had a substantial Korean operation. Indeed, it was there that the
accounting problems first surfaced. Mark Maremont et al., How High-Tech Dream
20051
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
would have been hard put to predict where the asset-center of the
company would be at the end of even so-short a time.
II. The Choice-of-Law Method
Two of the reasons that have persuaded most American experts to
favor a form of universalism in insolvency matters are the need for
predictability and the related question of expectations.24 Given the rapid
movement of assets around the world today, no rule can provide a
reasonable prediction about the results of a bankruptcy case except a
universalist system applying the bankruptcy law of the center of the
debtor's main interests. Such a rule is far from perfectly predictable, but
it is the only rule that provides any real predictability at all.
Related to predictability is the recognition of expectations.
Creditors (and others) dealing with a business should expect that a
general default by the business will be dealt with under the laws of the
home country of the business. To respond to that expectation a court
must choose a single applicable bankruptcy law.
5
In any bankruptcy case, whether purely domestic or multinational,
every pre-petition claim 26 presents two issues that are distinct
conceptually, although often hard to distinguish in the field2 7: first, the
validity and amount of a claim under applicable nonbankruptcy law;
second, the distribution right, or priority in payment, which will apply to
that claim in the distribution of the value that has been realized by the
bankruptcy administration. A simple example is the claim of a person
who suffered bodily injury by the debtor's act before the debtor's
bankruptcy. The necessary elements of a claim in tort (delicto) will be
governed by nonbankruptcy law, as will the measure of recoverable
damages and any limitations upon damages. Following United States
usage, the amount of the claim so calculated under nonbankruptcy law is
the "allowed" amount; that is, the sum that the claimant would have been
awarded in an ordinary lawsuit outside of bankruptcy. 28 However, the
Shattered in Scandal at Lernout & Hauspie, WALL ST. J. ( December 7, 2000).
24. See Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2282-99. See also Guzman, supra note 2,
at 2208.
25. To the extent that a nation's commitment is to modified universalism, this
proposition is one of several that are subject to pragmatic considerations in a particular
case, although such considerations should be viewed skeptically.
26. By "pre-petition claim," I mean claims that arose before the bankruptcy
proceeding was opened, as opposed to claims incurred in the administration of the
proceeding itself.
27. See IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (1999);
Donald T. Trautman, Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Emmanuel Gaillard, Four Models for
International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMp. L. 573, 583-86 (1994).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000).
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amount of money to be distributed to the injured person in bankruptcy
will depend upon the priority rules established by the law applicable to
the debtor's bankruptcy. In a system that gives a special priority to other
sorts of claims (for example, taxes and employee wages), there may be
nothing left to distribute to the injured claimant. On the other hand, if a
particular bankruptcy law gave priority to personal-injury claims, then
the claim might be paid in full.
As it happens, United States courts, because of its federal system,
have considerable experience with this problem in the context of two
separate bodies of law. Generally, state law controls the allowed amount
of a claim, but federal bankruptcy law governs the distribution priorities.
A similar dichotomy exists as to property interests. State law is often
applied in the delineation of a claimed property interest, while the effect
of that property interest in bankruptcy is governed by bankruptcy law.
This intersection of laws frequently arises in connection with security
interests, which are governed outside of bankruptcy by state law, but
carry with them enormous advantages in priority and even collateral
control in a bankruptcy proceeding.29 Their enforcement and priority in
bankruptcy arise from the intersection of state and federal law.
Precisely the same sorts of difficulties are presented in multinational
cases, because the law defining a claim or a property interest may often
be the law of a different country than the law governing the bankruptcy
proceeding itself. Thus, a bankruptcy court in a multinational case is
required to draw a line between the nonbankruptcy law governing the
existence and scope of a claim or a property interest and the bankruptcy
law governing the distributional effects thereof in the bankruptcy. In
choosing the law that defines the claim or property interest asserted
under nonbankruptcy law and its validity vel non under that law, the
29. See generally, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy,
82 TEX. L. REv. 795 (2004). A well-known example of the intersection of state and
federal law concerning security interests is a case in the United States Supreme Court,
Fidelity Fin. Servs. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998), where a security interest was properly
registered under state law, and therefore would ordinarily be enforceable in federal
bankruptcy court, but was subject to attack as a "preference" because it was registered
during the ninety-day preference period prior to the debtor's bankruptcy. The problem
was one of delay in registration after the security interest was created. State law allowed
a thirty-day delay in registration of the interest, but federal preference law allowed only
twenty days. The secured party had registered within the state "grace period" but outside
of the federal one. The question was which law controlled and the Bankruptcy Code
language was ambiguous. The details of the analysis are not important to the current
discussion, but in the end the Court concluded that federal law controlled and the security
interest was "avoided" (made ineffective) in the bankruptcy case. The interesting point
for us is the very close overlap between the two bodies of law. A crucial part of
American commercial law could be seriously crippled by incoherent distinctions in this
area, yet the task of making those distinctions is by no means easy.
2005]
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court should consider the usual choice-of-law factors like place of
contracting, the parties' choice of law, and so forth. But as to
distribution rules and other rules governing bankruptcy, it must choose
the applicable bankruptcy law by focusing upon the debtor's affairs as a
whole on a worldwide basis, looking to factors such as principal place of
business, principal location of assets, residence of most creditors, center
of financial interests, and the like.
Having established the general framework, we turn our attention to
the Lernout case to carry the analysis through.
III. The Choice of Law Analysis in Lernout
The first step in a case like Lernout is much like the relatively
simple one that served as our first example. The tort of stock fraud and
the entitlement to damages for those defrauded-the "allowed" claim-
would be governed by nonbankruptcy law, while the distribution to be
made on account of the allowed claim would naturally be determined by
bankruptcy law. Applying either a center of gravity theory or the
traditional "place of the wrong" theory,30 the applicable law of fraud
might well be found in the United States. 31 To that point the original
ruling of the lower courts applying American law seems easy to defend.
32
The difficulty comes with the next question: which bankruptcy law
should be applied to determine the priority in distribution of this type of
claim?
In a territorialist court, the answer is simple: the court should apply
its own bankruptcy law governing distribution of the assets controlled by
that court. Each nation's bankruptcy court will do the same and that will
be that. But for a court committed to any form of universalism, the
problem is more difficult. Because the objective is to distribute the
debtor's worldwide assets in a manner as close to a single, coherent
distribution as possible, the universalist court must consider which
bankruptcy law would apply in one global distribution.
If the debtor's principal place of business ("center of main
interests",33) and principal assets are in the same jurisdiction, it seems
30. RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 346-48
(4th ed. 2000).
31. For most purposes, there is no federal law of tort in the United States, so the
court would have to determine which state tort law would apply. However, in the case of
fraud involving securities, there is, in effect, a federal tort law that could be applied to
determine both liability and damages. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
32. Lernout I, supra note 9, at 400. That point may also be trivial, because it is
likely that Belgium would give the Stonington claimants similar rights. See supra note
11 and accompanying text.
33. This phrase has become the international standard. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l
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obvious that the bankruptcy law of that jurisdiction should be the one
applied in all but the rare case. The same conclusion seems compelled
where the assets are scattered among a number of jurisdictions: the
principal place of business should provide the controlling bankruptcy
law. The right answer may be somewhat less clear where the debtor's
center of main interests and its principal assets are in different
jurisdictions. That was the situation in Lernout because the company's
American acquisitions in the year before bankruptcy had produced an
asset base in the United States that exceeded its European assets. Under
some circumstances and as to some issues, contacts of that sort might
have supported application of United States bankruptcy law.34
The problem with the Lernout decisions is that these factors played
no part whatsoever in the court's choice-of-law decision. Instead, both
the bankruptcy and district courts looked to factors like the place of the
wrong and the parties choice of law in their merger agreement.35 Those
choice-of-law factors would have been highly relevant to the
determination of the validity and amount of the stock-fraud claim under
nonbankruptcy law. If, for example, United States and Belgian law had
differed in some element of the tort of fraud or in the calculation of
damages, those factors would have been key. However, as to the proper
bankruptcy rule-the rule of priority in distribution of a limited number of
assets to general creditors of equal entitlement-those factors were largely
irrelevant. As to that decision, the policy choice lay between satisfying
local policies by a territorial distribution of whatever assets could be
locally seized or satisfying the larger purposes of bankruptcy law by
choosing a single law to govern distribution worldwide, within practical
Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, art. 2(b)
(U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 1998); European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings,
Official Journal of European Communities 160, art. 3 § 1 (June 30, 2000); Title VIII, S.
256, H.R. 685, 1 0 4 th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005) (proposed Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code).
34. The location of assets may be linked to other specific factors that may affect the
choice-of-law decision in a particular circumstance. In Lernout, if there had been many
United States creditors that had extended credit to the American companies before the
acquisition then the analysis as to the appropriate worldwide distribution rule might
change. In that situation, those creditors could argue they had lent to American
companies and expected American law to apply in case of general default. Indeed, in the
appellate opinion in Maxwell, the court noted that the presence of many unpaid creditors
of the United States subsidiaries might have changed the analysis. Maxwell
Communication Corp. v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Communication Corp.), 93
F.3d 1036, 1052 (2d Cir. 1996). Thus the chosen rule might vary if the location and
nature of the assets was a crucial point. However, the bankruptcy and district courts in
Lernout never considered these factors at all. It is also worth emphasizing that the locus
of the assets might have shifted decisively in a short time. See supra text accompanying
note 23.
35. Id.
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constraints. Given the steady movement of United States law toward
modified universalism, the single-law approach should have been
adopted. In this case, that law should probably have been Belgian.
The emerging international rule in multinational bankruptcy cases
focuses on the center of the debtor's main interests. Up to now, that
standard has been adopted primarily as a choice-of-forum rule rather than
a choice-of-law rule, but it is necessary to use it for both purposes to
achieve the goals of universalism. 36 Given a company like Lernout,
which engaged in classic Nineties-style mergers around the world, no
other rule would give predictability. The center of gravity of the
company's assets might shift from month to month,37 while most
creditors and other concerned parties would naturally assume that
Belgian law would govern a worldwide company whose formal legal
connections, management, and financial dealings were concentrated in
Belgium.
Directly analogous is a Nineteenth Century case in the United States
Supreme Court in which the Court enforced the terms of a Canadian
reorganization plan for a Canadian company against New York
bondholders, even though payment to the bondholders was to be in New
York and New York law was the proper law of the contract. It explained
that the bondholders should have known that Canadian law was likely to
govern the general default or insolvency of a Canadian company. 38 That
conclusion is even more natural in the modern, globalizing world.
In Maxwell, the most important modern choice-of-law case in this
area, with precisely the same sort of division of management and assets
as in Lernout (principal management and financing in the United
Kingdom, principal assets in the United States), it was held that the
foreign bankruptcy law applied. 39 The picture is complicated by an
equivocal opinion in the Court of Appeals and by the fact that the issue
before the court in Maxwell was application of the preference power, but
on the whole the case is a powerful precedent favoring application of
Belgian law in Lernout.
40
36. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 488 (1991).
37. See supra text accompanying note 23.
38. Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 537-39 (1883).
39. Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell
Communication Corp.), 170 B.R. 800 ((Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd 186 B.R. 807
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
40. There would have been a case to be made for applying United States law in
Maxwell by analogy to the definition of "foreign proceedings" in subsection 101(23),
which provides four bases for finding a foreign proceeding entitled to United States
deference (that is, finds it to be the home country of the debtor): residence, domicile,
principal place of business, and location of principal assets. With the principal assets of
Lemout being in the United States, one could have argued that the application of United
[Vol. 23:3
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On that basis, a court committed to a form of universalism would be
wrong to approve a plan such as the one approved in Lernout. Not only
was it a territorialist plan, but it denied the stock-fraud claimants the
benefit of the Belgian distribution rules to which, on the above analysis,
they were entitled and would reasonably have expected to see applied in
the bankruptcy of a Belgian company.
IV. Procedures for Implementation
There remain some difficult questions of procedure in cases like
Lernout. In the United States, as in most countries, it is unclear if
distributions can be made under foreign bankruptcy rules or if local law
should be understood to require that the local rules be applied to any
distribution made by the local court. 41 That is, if a United States court
finds that a foreign bankruptcy-distribution rule applies, may it distribute
the proceeds of assets to creditors under the foreign rules, or is it bound
by its own distribution rules unless it dismisses its own proceeding and
sends the assets to the foreign court? The holding in the Maxwell case
permits a United States court to keep its own avoiding powers in
abeyance, but does not say whether the American court may apply the
avoiding powers of another country within the confines of a United
States full-bankruptcy proceeding.42 The increasing use of liquidating
plans in Chapter 1 1 cases may suggest a solution,43 because such plans
permit substantially more flexibility in distributions than under the
Chapter 7 priority rules.44  Thus a United States court might take
States bankruptcy law would be consistent with the statute, although it was equally
consistent to look to the principal place of business. As noted, the court chose the
principal place of business.
41. There are substantial differences in priority rules around the world despite a
pattern of preference for certain creditors, like secured parties, employees, and tax
authorities. See generally Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution in
Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local Interests,
73 Am. BANKR. L.J. 385 (1999); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Participation in
Transnational Bankruptcies, MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RoY
GOODE 419 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33
TEX. INT'L. L.J. 27 (1998).
42. The limited extant authority suggests that foreign avoiding powers cannot be
asserted in a full United States bankruptcy. See Choice ofAvoidance Law, supra note 21,
at 564 n. 99. One wonders if that rule will prevail, given that logically it would seem
such actions by a foreign trustee would not be so different from any other lawsuit "related
to" a pending bankruptcy under section 1334(b) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code and arising
under a foreign law. On the other hand, it seems reasonably clear that the United States
may apply foreign bankruptcy avoiding powers within a section 304 ancillary proceeding.
See id.
43. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Remembering Chapter 7, 23-May,
AM. BANKR. L.J. (2004).
44. The DIP in Lernout used the device of a liquidating plan. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
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Maxwell one step farther and say that it could apply the Belgian rule in
the United States proceeding.45
On the other hand, the court in a case like Lernout might decide
Belgian bankruptcy law should control distribution, but might be unsure
whether or not it could override the United States distribution rule in a
full Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. It might believe that United
States law would have to be followed in making a distribution in a
United States Chapter 11 proceeding, even though another bankruptcy
law should be applied through choice-of-law principles. In that situation,
the court may dismiss the United States bankruptcy under section 305 of
the Code, and act ancillary to the foreign proceeding under section 304.46
This approach will often make sense in such situations. If the
bankruptcy law of the other jurisdiction is to apply, it is obviously best
understood and applied by the other court
47
The excellent opinion of the Third Circuit in Lernout captured many
of the essential points suggested in this article. The appellate court
pointed out that the courts below had failed to consider "the nature of the
respective countries' policies and the principles animating the laws, so as
to determine which country actually had a stronger interest in its policies
being advanced., 48 It went on to say that cases such as this one require
"a qualitative assessment that can only occur if there is some
understanding, and explication, of the way in which the allowance, or
subordination, of the claims at issue would advance or detract from each
nation's policy regarding insolvency proceedings and distributions to
creditors." It also related the choice-of-law decision to the need for
cooperation. 49
The court of appeals did not, however, identify a general
commitment to universalism as a starting point for analysis, nor did it
require the courts below to look at the case from a global perspective.
Like the courts in Maxwell, it was cautious about large pronouncements,
focusing its attention on the case before it, as common law courts do.
Nonetheless, its analysis and conclusions were consistent with the
45. The court should, of course, seek cooperation with the other courts involved
regardless of the law chosen or the procedure followed. See U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law, Model Law On Cross-Border Insolvency With Guide To Enactment, arts. 25-26,
U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997). See generally, A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1. This
author has recently written another article concerning lack of cooperation in the Lemout
case. See Westbrook, supra note 10.
46. See e.g., In re Board of Directors of Multicanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2004).
47. In that circumstance, the court has the authority under § 304 to transfer the assets
to the control of the Belgian court for distribution under Belgian law. 11 U.S.C.
§ 304(b)(2) (2000).
48. Lernout II-Circuit, supra note 9, at 131.
49. Id. at 133 (citing Maxwell). See generally, Westbrook, supra note 10.
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method proffered in this article and its policy concerns point in the same
direction. Inherent in its instructions to the lower courts is the idea that a
single bankruptcy distribution rule is to be chosen.
Particularly important is the Third Circuit's emphasis on the
interests of the international system as a factor in making that choice.
One important choice-of-law method in the United States is known as
"interest analysis," and its basic logic greatly influences the application
of other approaches, like "significant contacts. '50  Interest analysis
emphasizes the importance of the common interest of the states involved
in a smoothly functioning international system.51 There could be no
better conclusion for this article than the admonition of the court of
appeals in Maxwell, "[i]t should be remembered that the interest of the
system as a whole-that of promoting 'a friendly intercourse between the
sovereignties,'-also furthers American self-interest, especially where
the workings of international trade and commerce are concerned.,
52
50. See e.g., McDoUGAL, FELIX & WHITTEN; AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, 337, 340-
41 (5th ed. 2001).
51. See Jay L. Westbrook, Extraterritoriality, Conflicts of Laws, and the Regulation
of Transnational Business, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 71, 79-82 (1990) (describing systemic
values in international choice-of-law).
52. Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1053 (citation omitted).
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